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Case No. 8378 
IN THE SUPREME COURT l1EOffVE!~: 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
CONTINENTAL BANK & TRUST 
COMPANY, a corporation, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
-vs.-
DEC -;:,. ' ~ . :~\ 
SKEEN, THURMAN, WORSLEY & SNOW, 
H. G. CHRISTENSEN and ALLEN M. SWAN, 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
CONTINENTAL BANK & TRUST 
COMPANY, a corporation, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
-vs.-
R. W. STEW ART, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No. 8378 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The respondent adopts the statement of the case 
set forth in the appellant's brief and will state additional 
facts only as those facts have particular bearing on re-
spondent's argument. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
2 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
THE JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF CONTINENTAL IN 
THE SUM OF $7,095'.81 AND THE FINDINGS AND CON-
CLUSIONS IN SUPPORT THEREOF ARE SUPPORTED BY 
SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE, AND APPELLANT HAS 
WAIVED HIS RIGHT TO NOW OBJECT TO THE AMOUNT 
OF THE JUDGMENT BY HIS PLEADINGS AND CONDUCT 
IN 'THE TRIAL COURT. 
POINT II. 
THE FINDING THAT APPELLANT AGREED TO PAY 
THE OBLIGATION OWED BY CHENEY TO CONTINENTAL 
IS SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE. 
POINT III. 
THE JUDGMENT OF THE TRIAL •COURT IS NOT ·CON-
TRARY TO THE LAW OF THIRD PARTY BENEFICIARY 
CONTRACTS. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF CONTINENTAL IN 
THE SUM OF $7,095'.81 AND THE FINDINGS AND CON-
CLUSIONS IN SUPPORT THEREOF ARE SUPPORTED BY 
SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE, AND APPELLANT HAS 
WAIVED HIS RIGHT TO NOW OBJE·CT TO THE AMOUNT 
OF THE JUDGMENT BY HIS PLEADINGS AND CONDUCT 
IN 'THE TRIAL COURT. 
The Trial Court concluded that Stewart was obli-
gated to pay to Continental Bank the sum of $6,694.16, 
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which sum included charges assessed against the Cheneys 
as a direct and foreseeable result of Stewart's breach. 
While there is no testimony in the transcript concerning 
the figure, $6,694.16, the record does make specific refer-
ence to judgments which were entered against 1Ir. Cheney 
as a result of the failure of Mr. Stewart to pay the obli-
gation to Continental Bank. Mr. Cheney testified that 
the Continental Bank had obtained judgments against 
him, and pursuant to them he was "summoned" into 
court (R. 15, 16). These judgments are detailed in the 
affidavit of appellant's counsel (R. 116), together with 
the dates on which they were entered. The total amount 
of the judgments, as detailed in the affidavit, is $5,990.96, 
which figure includes only principal and interest (R. 
116). The notes all provided for attorney's fees and 
costs were assessed in each judgment. These items repre-
sent the difference between $5,990.96 and $6,694.16. 
The appellant, Stewart, in paragraph 3 of his answer 
to plaintiff's complaint (R. 2), admitted that on the day 
the complaint was filed A. W. Cheney and Effie S. 
Cheney were indebted to the plaintiff in the sum of 
$6,694.16. The answer merely denied that the defendant, 
Stewart, had agreed to pay plaintiff, Continental Bank, 
and further that the defendant, Stewart, was indebted to 
plaintiff, Continental Bank, in the amount of $6,694.16. 
The issue, therefore, that was tried was as to the promise 
of Stewart to assume the obligation Cheney had with the 
Continental Bank, not the issue whether the figure $6,-
694.16 was the amount Cheney was obligated to pay. 
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A pretrial conference was held prior to the trial of 
this action and it was orally agreed at that tin1e that the 
amount $6,694.16 was not in dispute. This is further sup-
ported by the opening state1nent of counsel for appellant 
who remarked, "Our only statement, Your Honor, is that 
the defendant Stewart did not agree to pay the obligation 
owing Continental Bank & Trust" (R. 3). This was the 
entire context of the opening statement of counsel for 
Stewart and it is noteworthy that no contention was made 
at this point that the amount of the obligation was in 
dispute. 
Counsel for Continental Bank, believing that the 
amount involved was not in issue, merely referred to the 
figure as follows: "The amount, Your Honor, of the in-
debtedness between Cheney and Stewart is admitted in 
the answer to be $6,694.16, and, calling Your Honor's 
attention to that fact, the plaintiff will rest" (R. 20). 
It is probable that counsel meant to indicate that the 
indebtedness between Continental Bank and Cheney was 
admitted in the answer to be $6,694.16. If that was the 
intention of counsel, such was true, and no contention 
was made by counsel for appellant at any stage in the 
preceedings until this appeal that such was not the case. 
The Court found as follows (R. 110) : 
"7. As a consequence of the failure of de-
fendant, R. W. Stewart, to pay plaintiff, The Con-
tinental Bank & Trust Company, the amount due 
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on November 30, 1953, judgments were entered 
against A. W. Cheney and Effie S. Cheney in 
favor of plaintiff, The Continental Bank & Trust 
Company, in the total amount of $6,694.16." 
In defendant's :Motion to Amend Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law and Judgment (R. 113), referring to 
this paragraph 7, appellant requested in paragraph 2 
that the Court amend the findings by striking the fol-
lowing: "As a consequence of failure of defendant, R. W. 
Stewart, to pay plaintiff, The Continental Bank & Trust 
Company, the amount due on November 30, 1953." No 
motion was made to amend the amount which was found 
to be owing on that date. 
This gives rise to a further objection to appellant's 
citing the finding as error on appeal; that is, the fail-
ure of appellant to question the finding as to the amount 
due in the Trial Court. Counsel for Stewart, by affidavit 
(R. 116), attempted to show that newly discovered evi-
dence justified a new trial ( R. 118). This "newly dis-
covered evidence" was the discovery on the court files of 
four judgments against Cheney and his wife and in favor 
of Continental Bank in the sum of $5,990.96, plus attor-
ney's fees and costs. The objection \Vas made because of 
the apparent discrepancy between $5,990.96 and $6,280.00, 
the latter figure representing the sum which Cheney 
testified Stewart had assumed and agreed to pay Con-
tinental Bank (R. 13). This discrepancy was readily ex-
plained on motion for new trial by counsel's citing the 
F.H.A. regulationR which provide for a rebate of un-
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earned interest, according to a certain schedule, if a loan 
is repaid or a judgment taken on the loan before the 
period of time expires over which the loan is to run. 
Thus, although Cheney owed the Bank $6,280.00 on No-
vember 30, 1953, when judgment was taken against him 
on the notes in January of 1954, a rebate of interest re-
sulted in a reduction in the amount of principal and inter-
est owed to $5,990.96. But no contention was made by 
appellant on this motion or at any stage in the Trial 
Court that the total amount of the judgment, $6,694.16, 
was erroneously entered by the Court. 
As stated at 3 Am. Jur. 131, Appeal and Error, Sec. 
399, 
"Questions with respect to the amount allow-
ed or recovered in the Trial Court cannot ordin-
arily be raised for the first time on appeal or re-
view." 
Likewise, 4 C.J.S., Appeal and Error, Sec. 312, stated: 
"Questions relating to the amount of the re-
covery or the extent of the relief granted will 
generally not be considered in the Appellate Court 
unless they have first been raised in the court 
below by proper objection or request." 
The reasoning for the rule is clearly stated by this court 
in the case of Pettingill v. Perkins, 2 Utah 2nd 266, 272 
P. 2d 185, 186, as follows: 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
7 
"The duty is incumbent upon counsel to give 
the Trial Court the opportunity to correct the 
error before asking the Appellate Court to reverse 
a verdict and judgment thereon." 
It is submitted that the appellant has waived any ob-
jection to the amount sought to be recovered and entered 
in the judgment as a result of his failure to raise the 
question in the Trial Court. We do not believe Rule 52 
(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, wherein it is stated, 
"When findings of fact are made in actions tried by the 
court without a jury, the question of the sufficiency of the 
evidence to support the findings may thereafter be raised 
whether or not the party raising the question has made 
in the District Court an objection to such findings or 
has made either a motion to amend them or motion for 
judgment or a motion for a new trial," is applicable to 
this situation for the reason that here the defendant did 
raise objections in the Trial Court to certain findings of 
fact, and the objections were duly considered by that 
Court. Yet, in the objections raised, no contention was 
made that the finding should have reflected the figure 
$6,280.00 rather than $6,694.16. 
POINT II. 
THE FINDING THAT APPELLANT AGREED TO PAY 
THE OBLIGATION OWED BY CHENEY TO CONTINENTAL 
IS SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE. 
Appellant contends that the finding that appellant 
agreed to pay the obligation owed by Cheney to Con-
tinental is not supported by substantial evidence and that 
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such a state of facts is inherently improbable. The argu-
ment of appellant indicates that he wishes this Court to 
believe that Stewart would not, as an intelligent man, 
experienced in real estate transactions, have assumed to 
pay obligations which were not liens or mortgages on the 
real property he was buying. 
First, let it be pointed out that perhaps the most 
trustworthy witness and most favorable witness for the 
respondent bank at the trial was not a person called to the 
stand, but the figure which Stewart concedes was the 
figure he agreed to pay "to banks"; that is, the figure, 
$17,64 7 .80. This figure is reduced to writing in the 
Earnest Money Agreement signed by Cheney and. Stewart 
(Exhibit 1-P). If Stewart intended to assu1ne all the 
obligations which were liens or mortgages on the land, 
as he now asserts, then he would only have had to assume· 
on November 30, 1953 the sum of $15,506.94, since this 
figure represents the total of the following obligations: 
(1) the Barnes Bank first mortgage for $4,970.50, with 
interest thereon from November 16, 1952 at 6% (R. 93), 
or approximately $309.67; (2) the Barnes Bank second 
mortgage in the amount of $6,000.00, with interest there-
on at 6% from August 13,1953 (R. 94) in the approximate 
amount of $106.77; (3) the mortgage on the cows and 
the land which Barnes Bank sold to Valley State Bank 
with a balance of $4,120.00, including interest (R. 94). 
The total of these figures is $2,140.86 less than Stewart 
obligated himself to pay. Mr. Gailey of Barnes Bank, 
a witness for Stewart, testified on direct examination 
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that Stewart had called on him and discussed these obli-
gations prior to the date of the Earnest Money Agree-
ment (R. 95). It is incredible that Stewart, knowing of 
these amounts, would have agreed to pay $2140.86 over 
and above the mortgages if his intention was to assume 
only secured indebtedness. But if Stewart intended to 
pay Continental Bank and Barnes Bank, the calculation 
would be as follows: First mortgage and second mort-
gage of Barnes Bank set forth above totaling $11,386.94, 
plus $6,280.00, the figure representing the Continental 
indebtedness, or a total of $17,666.94. Note that there 
is a discrepancy between this total and the sum Stewart 
agreed to assume of only $19.14, which discrepancy could 
easily result on the interest calculation. Certainly this 
evidence, contributed by the figures themselves, fully sus-
tains the finding of the Trial Court that Stewart assumed 
the obligation to pay Continental Bank. The figures on 
the slips of paper which Bell, the real estate agent, totaled 
in the presence of both Cheney and Stewart (R. 27) must 
have included the Continental Bank and Barnes Bank 
obligations, otherwise the figure $17,647.80 could not have 
been arrived at on any reasonable basis. It should be 
emphasized that Stewart insisted the obligation to Valley 
State Bank in the amount of $2860.00 (R. 103), and se-
cured by a mortgage on cows only, was not part of the 
deal (R. 69). But if it was Stewart's intention to assume 
all indebtedness of the seller, Cheney, to the Barnes Bank 
and Valley State Bank, then the total amount which 
he would have assumed to pay would be $18,366.94. No 
combination of figures introduced through the various 
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witnesses, including officers of both Valley State Bank 
and Barnes Bank, totals anywhere near $17,64 7 .80, ex-
cept the total of the two notes to Barnes Bank and the 
Promissory notes to Continental. 
It is significant that the witness Bell, who closed the 
sale of the property, was not positive that the figures 
which he used in computing the $17,647.80 did not include 
the Continental Bank obligation. On cross examination 
Bell admitted that the Continental Bank indebtedness 
could have been included in the tabulation of figures that 
he made (R. 35). 
Appellant asserts that the only testimony concerning 
the Continental Bank having been the intended benefi-
ciary of this agreement is oral. Yet the most reliable 
evidence in arriving at the intention of the parties is the 
written Earnest l\foney Agreement itself which refers 
to the payment to banks as follows: "Arrangements to 
pay banks in the amount set forth amounting to 
$17,647.80." 
The written evidence introduced at the trial by ap-
pellant which has been referred to as the "clarification 
agreement" of December 3, 1955 (Exhibit 3-D) could not 
have been entered into for the purpose of clarifying the 
agreement of November 30th as appellant contends. 
Note that the agreement of December 3rd does not clarify 
which banks were meant in the original contract of No-
vember 30th. The insertion in the agreement of December 
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3rd of the words "and assume all obligations secured by 
liens or mortgages on the real property" indicates no 
purpose to clarify when it is considered that the meeting 
was called at l\Ir. Iverson's office for the apparent pur-
pose of reducing to writing the agreement to substitute 
the Texas property for the $6,000.00 cash payment origin-
ally included in the Earnest :Money Agreement. The in-
sertion of the clause referring to liens and mortgages 
seems incidental to the purpose of the meeting and the 
contract when read as a whole. 
The same must be said for the evidence introduced 
through Mr. Greenwood, attorney for Cheney, concerning 
a emnplaint filed in Davis County (Exhibit 2-D), wherein, 
as an aside, it is stated, referring to the earnest money 
agreement, 
"Whereby defendant undertook to pay $23,-
647.80 for said property payable $17,647.80 to 
banks holding various liens and mortgages upon 
said premises." 
Neither the "clarification" agreement of December 3rd 
nor the complaint filed by Mr. Greenwood was primarily 
concerned with the assumption by Stewart of obligations 
owed by Cheney to banks. 
Another observation concerning the "clarification" 
agreement of December 3rd is worthy of mention. At 
page 50 of the record, the witness Stewart was asked on 
cross examination whether he had any further conversa-
tions with Cheney concerning the obligations at any time 
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after December 3rd. Stewart replied that he did have a 
subsequent conversation, probably about the 4th of De-
cember, at Cheney's place. Stewart stated that in sub-
stance the conversation was as follows: 
"A. I was interested in knowing what obligations 
he had and how much he owed on these, 
against the place, not only the real-
Q. Tell us just what was said by you and what 
was said by him. 
A. Well, I mentioned to Mr. Cheney that he owed 
a great deal more on the place than he had 
represented to me that he had. I said, 'You 
not only owe Barnes Bank so much, the Valley 
State Bank, but,' I said, 'in checking over, I 
find you also have an F.H.A. against the 
Continental on this thing, which makes a total 
price for the place of approximately twenty-
eight or twenty-nine thousand,' I says, 'and 
I only agreed to pay you approximately 
twenty-three thousand for the place.' I think 
that was the approximate figure." 
The question raised by this testimony is why a conversa-
tion was had on December 4 concerning obligations owing 
to various banks, one of which was obviously not a lien 
or mortgage on the property, if the agreement of Decem-
ber 3rd, executed one day prior thereto, had resolved the 
question as to which obligations were meant by those 
owing to "banks." The defendant Stewart testified that 
he had gone to the Continental Bank and checked the 
amount of the obligation when the "second agreement" 
was executed (R. 87). 
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The entire testimony of Stewart is somewhat diffi-
cult of belief when certain inconsistencies are noted. For 
instance, Stewart, at page 80 of the record, testified that 
he knew of the obligation of Cheney to Continental Bank 
prior to the execution of the earnest money agreement, 
yet didn't know the nature of it. His entire effort at the 
trial to disprove liability was on the basis that he intend-
ed to assume only obligations that were liens or mort-
gages on the land. The very nature of the obligation in 
question in the case, admittedly, according to Stewart, 
was not understood by him at the time the agreement was 
signed. 
It is further observed that Stewart, being a man ex-
perienced in real estate transactions, if his intention was 
to pay only obligations that were liens and mortgages on 
the property, conducted himself in a very unusual man-
ner. He did not agree in writing to pay off "the obliga-
tions that were liens and mortgages on the property/' 
but to pay a certain amount, yet this amount was not com-
puted as a result of Stewart's investigation of items 
that were liens and mortgages on the property, but rather, 
was the result of a tabulation of slips of paper handed 
to Bell and Stewart by Cheney (R. 60), containing a list 
of certain bank obligations. Stewart also testified that 
he had gone to the County Recorder's Office of Davis 
County (R. 89), and satisfied himself as to the amount 
of the liens on the property and discovered that the 
amount of the Barnes Bank indebtedness did not square 
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with Cheney's figures (R. 88), yet he obligated himself 
to pay a certain amount of money when the obvious thing 
would have been for him to obligate himself to pay those 
obligations that were liens and mortgages and detail 
the same. Stewart also testified that he relied on the 
County Recorder's Office of Davis County for informa-
ti()n as to the amount owing by Cheney on various o bliga-
tions. On cross examination Stewart stuck to this story 
even though it was admitted by him that the County 
Recorder's Office would not indicate the amount then 
owing on the obligations, but rather, the amounts of the 
original liens (R. 89). 
If a good reason is needed for supporting the propo-
sition that two supposedly intelligent men could have 
entered into the contract intending that Continental Bank, 
an unsecured creditor, be a beneficiary thereof, it is found 
in this testimony of Cheney (R. 9): 
"I told them that I also owed the Continental 
Bank because they put up the money for remodel-
ing of the home and the building of a new garage 
and a lounging shed, and that I would like them 
paid because the bank had been very white with 
me, and 1\fr. Stewart told me, he said, 'We will 
personally take care of that and see that that is 
paid'." 
Cheney further testified that Mr. Steffenson from the 
Continental Bank had been to his home the day before 
and requested him to sign another mortgage on his prop-
erty. Cheney testified (R. 10) : 
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"Vl ell I took the idea it would interfere with 
the sale of the property by signing another mort-
gage, so I told him to wait because we thought we 
had a sale in the making and that party that was 
making the sale would take care of the bank; and 
:Jfr. Stewart told me that he would take care of the 
bank.'' 
Obviously, the F.H.A. loans were used for the improve-
ment of the real property, and even though not liens 
thereon, it is reasonable to expect a seller of the property 
to attempt to satisfy the cost of improving it out of the 
proceeds. It is also obvious that Steffenson was press-
ing Cheney for payment of the Continental obligations, 
or, in the alternative, security in the form of another 
real estate mortgage. 
The appellant's contention that accepting Cheney's 
testimony results in a judgment that is harsh, unfair and 
inequitable is apparently based on the testimony that Mr. 
Stewart, subsequent to the execution of the agreement of 
November 30, 1953, paid an obligation at Valley State 
Bank, which was a lien on the land. It is interesting to 
note that he has also satisfied an obligation to that bank 
which was not a lien on the land (R. 79). If the result 
in this case is harsh, it is so only because Stewart volun-
teered to pay an obligation which he was not legally 
obligated to pay by the agreement of November 30, 1953. 
POINT III. 
THE JUDGMENT OF THE TRIAL COURT IS NOT CON-
TRARY TO THE LAW OF THIRD PARTY BENEFICIARY 
CONTRACTS. 
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It is conceded that the Continental Bank stood in no 
better shoes than did Cheney. But Cheney could have 
sued on the obligation of November 3, 1953, which ad-
mittedly was never modified, and, by showing what was 
shown in the Trial Court, including evidence that the 
banks referred to were Barnes Banking Company and 
Continental, he could have recovered $23,670.80, less any 
amount Stewart had paid said banks, and less $6000.00 
represented by the Texas property which had since been 
conveyed to hirn. He could never have recovered the 
amount Stewart voluntarily paid to Valley State Bank, 
nor could Valley State Bank have enforced the contract 
in its behalf on the evidence presented. Thus, it is en-
tirely probable that the judgment of the Trial Court could 
be sustained if plaintiff were Cheney instead of Contin-
ental. Appellant's argument that Continental cannot pre-
vail as a matter of law is without merit. 
CONCLUSION 
Two frequent observations of this Court seem par-
ticularly applicable to the instant appeal. The first is to 
the effect that this Court is required to take all the evi-
dence and every reasonable inference therefrom in a light 
most favorable to the prevailing party in the Trial Court. 
Kimball Elevator Co., Inc. v. Elevator Supplies Co., Inc., 
2 Utah (2d) 289, 27~ P. 2d 583. The second is to the effect 
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that the trial judge who sees and hears the witnesses is in 
a better position than this Court to properly evaluate 
them and pass on their credibility. Green v. Equitable 
Life Assurance Society of U.S., 3 Utah (2d) 375, 284 P. 
(2d) 695. Three persons participated in the conferences 
prior to the execution of the earnest money agreement. 
Cheney and Stewart told conflicting stories in the court 
below. Bell, the real estate agent was too uncertain to 
fortify either version of the transaction. Applying the 
propositions stated above to the situation here, the judg-
ment of the Trial Court is wholly justified by the weight 
of the evidence and should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
SKEEN, THURMAN, WORSLEY & SNOW, 
H. G. CHRISTENSEN and ALLEN M. SWAN, 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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